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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
SECTION OF THE COUNTRY AS A SUBSIDIARY ISSUE IN
LITIGATION BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.*
A careful reading of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of the
Clayton Act indicates the crucial importance of economic market analysis in
litigation brought under that section. Section 7 prohibits mergers between
two corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
"where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."'
In actions brought under amended section 7, the Government has been required
to prove (1) an appropriate line of commerce, (2) a relevant section of the
country, and (3) reasonable probability of a substantial lessening of competition
within the line of commerce and section of the country.2 Line of commerce
defines the product market3 and section of the country defines the geographic
market.4 Together they comprise what is known as the "relevant market," 5 in
which the anticompetitive effects of a merger must be tested.6 The nature of the
proof involved clearly emphasizes the importance of careful market analysis.
The recent case of United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.7 has altered this basic
test. Despite the logical necessity of careful market analysis in section 7 actions,
Pabst has deemphasized its importance in favor of a presumptive-illegality
approach. The result is a deviation from legislative intent in enforcing amended
section 7, together with an unwarranted extension of governmental power.
* 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
1 Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending Act of April
31, 1914, ch. 323, § 19, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
2 United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
accord, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259
F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576,
583 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
3 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 2, at 588. The term "product
market" means the relevant market in terms of substitutability of products. United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 283 (1964) (dissenting opinion). For example,
if Corporation A manufacturing product a merges with Corporation B, which makes product
b, and a can be substituted for b by the consumer, the product market includes both
products. On the other hand, if a cannot be substituted for b, the products are not in com-
petition with one another, and there is no product market which includes both a and b.
"Product market" and "line of commerce" are interchangeable terms.
4 The "geographic market" defines the relevant market in terms of substitutability of
production facilities. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 3. If Corpora-
tions A and B manufacture the same product, the issue is whether the facilities of the
corporations are in such a geographic relationship with the consumer that he may choose
whether to buy from either A or B. If he has this choice, the production facilities of A
are said to be substitutable for those of B, and the corporations are contained within a
single geographic market. If the consumer does not have this choice, the corporations are
operating in different geographic markets and are not competing with one another. "Geo-
graphic market" and "section of the country" are equivalent.
5 See Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, supra note 2; American Crystal Sugar Co. v.
Cuban-American Sugar Co., supra note 2.6 E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963); see Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); Bock, Mergers and Markets
85 (3d ed. 1964).
7 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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In Pabst the Government charged that by acquiring Blatz's Brewing Company,
Pabst had violated amended section 7. At the trial,8 the parties agreed that the
continental United States was a relevant section of the country. The Government
attempted to prove that the state of Wisconsin, and the tri-state area of Michigan,
Illinois, and Wisconsin were also relevant sections of the country. At the close
of the Government's case, the district court held that the only relevant section
of the country, in terms of competition in the beer industry, was the continental
United States, and that the Government had failed to prove that competition
would suffer in the national market as a result of the acquisition.9
On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that:
[W]hen the Government brings an action under §7 it must . .. prove no
more than that there has been a merger between two corporations engaged
in commerce and that the effect of the merger may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce "in any
section of the country." ... Proof of the section of the country where the
anticompetitive effect exists is entirely subsidiary to the crucial question
in this and every §7 case which is whether a merger may substantially lesson
competition anywhere in the United States.'0
Justices Douglas, Harlan (joined by Justice Stewart), White, and Fortas
wrote concurring opinions. Mr. Justice Fortas stated that "unless both the
product and the geographical market are carefully defined, neither analysis
nor result in antitrust is likely to be of acceptable quality."" Justice Harlan,
feeling that "the Court's opinion ... appears to emasculate the statutory phrase
'in any section of the country,' "-12 made a thorough analysis of the facts and
concluded that both Wisconsin and the tri-state area were relevant sections of
the country.'3 Mr. Justice White concurred only "insofar as . . . [the Court]
holds the merger of Pabst and Blatz may substantially lessen competition in the
beer industry in the Nation as a whole."'14
While all five concurring Justices agreed with the disposition of the case,
four of them (Harlan, Stewart, White, and Fortas) disagreed with the language
of the majority which relegated "section of the country" to a subsidiary role.
It is this language which creates the problem; it therefore provides a starting
point from which to analyze the direction taken by the courts in determining
"section of the country" since the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment, and to
predict the probable impact of Pabst on future antitrust litigation.
Legislative History of "Section of the Country"
As enacted in 1914, section 7 prohibited corporate mergers "where the effect
of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the
corporation ... so acquired, and the corporation making the acquisition, or to
8 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475 (ED. Wis. 1964), rev'd, 384
U.S. 546 (1966).
9 Id. at 488-89.
10 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549-50 (1966).
11 Id. at 562 (concurring opinion).
12 Id. at 555 (concurring opinion).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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restrain such commerce in any section or community .... -"5 Since the competi-
tion which exists between the acquired and acquiring companies is necessarily
eliminated by a merger, a strict interpretation of the original section might have
resulted in the prohibition of all horizontal mergers. Apparently to avoid this
result, courts judicially deleted the "acquired-acquiring" test, instead testing
horizontal mergers solely in terms of the effect of the merger on the industry
as a whole.16 This "industry-wide-market" test gave way to the more refined
"relevant-market" test of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment. Both tests are
based upon the same principle, requiring that anticompetitive effects of a merger
be measured in a defined market area.
The basic policy aims of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment were the prevention
of economic concentration through mergers and the protection of competition.
A secondary and sometimes conflicting goal was the protection of the indepen-
dence of small businessmen. 17 These policy aims were to be effectuated by
broad application of the amended section to acquisitions which are economically
significant.' 8 In order to exclude those mergers which are economically insignifi-
cant, Congress deleted the words "or community," which had appeared in the
original act. This alleviated the fears of some members of Congress that mergers
between two minor companies in a small town would fall within the amended
section 7.19 It also illustrated "Congress' desire to indicate that its concern was
with the adverse effects of a given merger on competition only in an economically
significant 'section' of the country."20
Suggested Tests for Defining "Section of the Country." Though the under-
lying policy was carefully elucidated, the congressional reports on the amend-
ment to section 7 properly refrained from establishing inflexible standards for
defining "section of the country:"
What constitutes a section will vary with the nature of the product. Owing
to the differences in the size and character of markets, it would be meaning-
less, from an economic point of view, to attempt to apply for all products
a uniform definition of section....21
15 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (now Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125
(1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964)).
16 Note, "Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 766,
769 (1952); see, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); V. Vivaudou,
Inc. v. FTC, 54 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931); Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed.
401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923).
17 S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); 96 Cong. Rec. 16506-07 (1950)
(remarks of Senator O'Conor); 95 Cong. Rec. 11484-507 (1949). The Celler-Kefauver
Amendment also filled a specific loophole in § 7, which had prohibited a "corporation engaged
in commerce . . . [from acquiring] directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce . . . ."
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), by adding: "and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of one or more corporations .... " Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950),
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
18 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1775, supra
note 17, at 4297; see Handler & Robinson, "A Decade of Administration of the Celler-
Kefauver Antimerger Act," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 664 (1961); Comment, 46 Iln. L. Rev.
444, 454-55 (1951).
19 S. Rep. No. 1775, supra note 17, at 4; 96 Cong. Rec. 16456 (1950) (remarks of
Senator Kefauver); 95 Cong. Rec. 11488 (1949) (remarks of -Congressman Celler); Note,
"Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 766, 779 (1952).
20 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 18.
21 S. Rep. No. 1775, supra note 17, at 5.
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This pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of "section of the country"
emphasized that geographic market selection must be made on the basis of
commercial realities, and left the issue to be decided by the courts on a case-by-
case basis.22
Although the Senate Report did not create inflexible standards for defining
"section of the country" in an individual case, it did suggest alternative bases
which might be used to define a section. On the one hand, a section may be the
area in which a significant proportion of trade in a particular line of commerce
is carried on. On the other hand, it may be an area which is so isolated from
other areas by peculiar economic factors that it is "not affected by the trade in
that product in other parts of the country." 23 It is primarily this second alter-
native standard which has been used by the courts to define "section of the
country."
24
The Second Alternative Standard. Under the second alternative standard
suggested by the Senate Report,25 the geographic market in a section 7 action is
an area of such size that a manufacturer or distributor outside the area cannot
compete effectively for customers within the area.26 Under this test, unique
economic factors must exist which isolate the relevant section from other
geographic markets. 2 "The geographic structure of supplier-customer relations"2 8
is of primary importance in determining the section. Elements of this relation-
ship which the courts will find germane are the producer's proximity to other
producers, product perishability and freight rates for its transportation, 9 the
convenience of doing business with the defendant corporation rather than with
one of its competitors,30 the availability of alternative sources of supply to the
customer,2 1 and the relative difficulty or ease of entry into the market for new
competitors 32 Where these factors exist so as to economically isolate one
22 Ibid.; see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 18, at 336-37.
23 S. Rep. No. 1775, supra note 17, at 6.
24 A few of the more significant cases decided by the use of this standard are United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962);
Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961); American Crystal Sugar Co.
v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
25 S. Rep. No. 1775, supra note 17, at 6.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 120-22
(D. Del. 1963), vacated and remanded, 378 U.S. 158 (1965), complaint dismissed on remand,
246 F. upp. 917 (D. Del. 1966), cert. granted, - Sup. Ct. - (1967).
27 This separation of geographic markets is necessarily artificial in one sense because
of the inability to realistically chart a dividing line between markets. As one travels from
the center of the section as defined by this test, where the factors prohibiting entry from
without are most prominent, toward the border of the section, the possibilities for entry
increase, until at some point it is quite probable that those outside the section will be able
to compete effectively with some of those within. This problem was not considered sig-
nificant for antitrust purposes in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 24,
at 359-60 n.37.
28 Id. at 357.
29 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 817 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., supra note 26, at 121; cf.
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 331-33 (1961).
30 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 27, at 358; Crown Zellerbach
Corp. v. FTC, supra note 29.
31 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 916 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
32 For an analysis of the effect of this factor on choice of section, see United States v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra note 31, at 916-17.
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geographic area from all others, that area is a section of the country, or an area
of effective competition,33 according to the second alternative standard. After
passage of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment, it remained for the courts to
determine what part this concept was to play as a practical matter in the trial
of an antitrust action.
Judicial History of "Section of the Country"
In United States v. El. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,34 a case in which the
line of commerce was at issue, the Court held that determination of a "relevant
market" is a necessary predicate to the finding of a violation of section 735
Although du Pont was decided under the old section 7 and dealt specifically
with the determination of a relevant product market, this proposition was
adopted as a valid standard in later cases decided under the amended section,3 6
and was extended to encompass the necessity of finding a relevant geographic
market.8 7
The Brown Shoe Decision. Not until 1962, in the leading case of Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States,3 8 did the Supreme Court have occasion to elaborate
thoroughly upon the meaning of amended section 7. Brown Shoe, the third-
largest seller of shoes in the United States by dollar volume, and in control
of 1230 retail outlets, acquired the G. R. Kinney Shoe Company, the eighth
largest shoe manufacturer and owner of 350 retail outlets. The Court found the
relevant geographic market for testing the horizontal aspect of the merger to be
"cities with a population exceeding 10,000 and their environs in which both
Brown and Kinney retailed shoes through their own outlets."39
Having found this section of the country, the Court adopted the findings of
fact of the district court, which had made a detailed analysis of competition in
shoe retailing in St. Louis, a city in which Kinney did not operate. These findings
were interpolated, together with testimony concerning shoe retailing in forty
other cities where Kinney and Brown stores had been in competition with one
another, and the Court concluded that the merger would have severe anti-
competitive effects in retail shoe sales.40 It also found that, using the nation
33 The Senate Report on the Celler-Kefauver Amendment also specifically endorsed the
definition of geographic market given in a then recent Supreme Court decision. S. Rep.
No. 1775, supra note 17, at 6, citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
In that case, decided under § 7 prior to the amendment, the Court defined the geographic
market as an area of effective competition. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra at
299-300 n.5. Thus, an area of effective competition is equivalent to a section of
the country.
34 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
35 Id. at 593.
36 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 937 (1962); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d
524, 527 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Bock, Mergers and Markets 85 (3d ed. 1964); Kaysen & Turner, Anti-
trust Policy 134 (1959) ; Note, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 97, 100 (1962).
37 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
38 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
39 Id. at 339.
40 Id. at 340-41. It has been argued that the district court in Brown Shoe, by adopting
the cities as sections of the country, and then analyzing the possible effects of the merger
in a city which was not a relevant geographic market as defined, totally ignored the
geographic market in its analysis. Handier & Robinson, supra note 18. But it appears that
the district court did not use St. Louis to analyze anticompetitive effect, but only to deter-
mine the pattern of competition in shoe retailing in cities and their surrounding areas.
United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 734 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
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as a whole as the relevant geographic market, the vertical aspect of the merger
would have severe anticompetitive effects.41
In terms of defining "section of the country," the Brown Shoe opinion con-
tributed significantly to antitrust law in several respects. First, the Court
emphasized that a geographic market can be as small as a single metropolitan
area or as large as the entire nation.42 Second, the Court said that, within a
geographic market, there may be submarkets4" which can be considered appro-
priate sections of the country. 44 Third, the Court went to great lengths to show
that each case arising under amended section 7 must be approached pragmat-
ically. "The geographic market selected must ... 'correspond to the commercial
realities' of the industry and be economically significant. ' 45 Fourth, the Court
suggested that amended section 7 is broad enough to prohibit a merger even
though the merging parties compete only in a small area of the country which is
likely to be affected by the merger.46 Fifth, and most significant for the purposes
of the present analysis, the Court followed the teaching of du Pont47 in holding
that determination of a relevant market is a necessary predicate to finding a
violation of amended section 7.48
Developments After Brown Shoe. The significance of the proposition that
determination of a relevant market is necessary to finding a violation of amended
section 7 can be appreciated in the context of the fact situation in United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank.49 In that case the decision hinged upon the section
of the country found to be relevant. The merger involved was one between the
second and third largest of the banks having main offices in the Philadelphia
metropolitan area. Statistics presented at trial by the Government established
that a sizeable proportion of the business of the two banks was in the metro-
politan area.50 Despite these statistics, the district court held that the entire
41 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 37, at 334.
42 Id. at 337; accord, United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153,
193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F.
Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
43 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962); accord, Erie Sand &
Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1961); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
44 Pabst is an excellent example of the submarket concept. If it is assumed that the
geographic market for beer sales is a regional one, and the area of Wisconsin, Illinois, and
Michigan comprises the geographic market, then the state of Wisconsin is a submarket for
§ 7 purposes, if it corresponds "to the commercial realities of the industry and . . . [is]
economically significant." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 43, at 336-37.
[Citations omitted.]
45 Ibid.
46 Id. at 337 n.65. In two cases since Brown, variations of this situation have arisen.
A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., supra note 43. The Senate Report on the Celler-Kefauver Amendment goes
even further by indicating that a merger might be prohibited if its effect is substantial
in a section where neither of the merging firms is present:
It should be noted that although the section of the country in which there may be
a lessening of competition will normally be one in which the acquired company or the
acquiring company may do business, the bill is broad enough to cope with a sub-
stantial lessening of competition in any other section of the country as well.
S. Rep. No. 1775, supra note 17, at 6.
47 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
48 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 43, at 324.
49 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
60 In the words of the district court:
As of September, 1960, combining the figures for the two banks, commercial and indus-
trial loans outstanding in the four-county area amounted to 57%7 of the total dollar
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northeastern United States, rather than the four-county Philadelphia metro-
politan area, was the relevant section of the country.5'
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.52 It found that the distance a customer
will travel to obtain alternative banking service is a function of the size of
his banking business. Large borrowers and large depositors bank in a regional or
national geographic market while small borrowers and depositors are restricted
to their immediate neighborhoods. Thus, drawing the geographic market too
broadly would have diluted the effect of the merger on competition for local
customers, while drawing it too narrowly would have placed the merging banks
in different sections of the country, minimizing the effect of the merger on com-
petition outside the City of Philadelphia. Faced with these two extremes, the
Court found that the Philadelphia metropolitan area was a geographic market.53
This compromise was in line with state law and the findings of three federal
banking agencies which had treated the four-county area as a geographic
market for their regulatory purposes."
Clearly, the Court's choice of a section was a compromise based upon the pre-
dominantly local nature of the business of small and intermediate sized bank
customers.5 5 It is also clear that the section of the country found to be relevant
was only a rough approximation of the actual geographic market in which the
two banks operated. 56 While the facts did not fit neatly within either of the
suggested standards of the Senate Report,57 the Court's approach in seeking
some rational basis for making a finding of "section of the country" closely
follows the spirit of the Report.58 This approach contrasts strikingly with the
Court's language in Pabst, holding that "section of the country" is a sub-
sidiary issue.59
The Court's treatment of the problem of finding the geographic market in
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank indicates that no reasonable conclusion can be
reached regarding the effect of a merger without a preliminary finding of
a relevant section of the country, based upon analysis of the geographic market
structure in the industry involved. In order for this analysis to be valid, it must
be made with great care. In a recent bank-merger case, the District Court for
amount; loans to individuals . . . 721 . . . ; lines of credit outstanding . . . 49%
; personal trusts . . . 83.1% . . . ; and, demand deposits . . . 75.4% of the
total dollar amount.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
51 Id. at 363-64.
52 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
53 Id. at 361-62.
54 Id. at 360-61. Congress did not disapprove this type of market analysis as applicable
to bank mergers when it amended the Bank Merger Act. 80 Stat. 7 (1966), amending 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964); see H.R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). But the
amended act does establish new procedures for Government suits to enjoin bank mergers.
United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
and two other bank merger cases pending on the date Philadelphia Nat'l Bank was decided
were exempted from the provisions of the new act, with the result that the mergers were
authorized, despite adverse judicial findings. The exemption was the basis for two of the
dissenting reports on the bill. See H.R. Rep. No. 1221, supra at 27, 31. See also supplemental
views of Congressman Ottinger, id. at 39.
55 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 52, at 359 n.36.
56 Id. at 360.
57 See S. Rep. No. 1775, supra note 17, at 6.
58 Ibid.
59 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549-50 (1966).
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the Southern District of New York emphatically asserted the necessity for
careful analysis of the relevant market:
If the product and geographic markets are scrambled,.., or selected services
homogenized and analyzed while others are ignored, . .. probable anti-
competitive effects in one market might be offset by pro-competitive con-
sequences in the other, leading us to a false conclusion that on balance the
merger may, or may not, restrain trade, substantially lessen competition,
or tend to monopoly in either market. Such an approach to the problem is
fundamentally unsound .... 60
The Impact of Pabst on Future Litigation
The Pabst Decision. The legislative and judicial history of "section of the
country" demonstrates that the purpose of the concept is to provide a geographic
market framework within which the anticompetitive effects of a merger can be
tested. Set against this background, Pabst is illustrative of a trend in recent
Supreme Court decisions toward interpreting section 7 more liberally in favor of
the Government.
At the trial of Pabst6l the only contested issue was whether Wisconsin and the
tri-state area of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Illinois were relevant sections of
the country. The facts pointed toward a decision on this issue in favor of the
Government. Both Pabst Brewing Company and Blatz Brewing Company were
significant competitors in the two contested areas.6 2 The percentage of the
market occupied by a small number of the largest sellers indicated that the
market for beer sales in Wisconsin and the tri-state area was oligopolistic.63
Sales statistics showed that in the two areas a small number of large firms
effectively controlled beer sales.64 This, in turn, made entry into either of the
markets exceedingly difficult for new competitors, leading one to conclude that
the two areas were relevant sections, according to the second alternative standard
of the Senate Report.
Given the sufficiency of evidence which could have been used to justify a
finding that the two contested areas were relevant sections of the country, the
question arises as to what the Court meant when it called the determination of
"section of the country" a subsidiary issue.
60 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 918-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
61 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475 (E. D. Wis. 1964).
62 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra note 59, at 558 (concurring opinion). In
Wisconsin in 1957, the year before the merger, Blatz was the largest seller of beer with
12.81% of all beer sold. Pabst was fourth with 11.14% of the market. The merger made the
corporation first in sales in Wisconsin, with 23.95% of the market in 1958 and 27.41% in
1961. In 1957 Pabst made 13% and Blatz made 31% of its total national sales in the state.
In the tri-state area, Blatz was the sixth largest seller of beer in 1957, with 5.84% of
sales. Pabst was the seventh largest seller, with 5A8% of all sales. Id. at 550-51.
63 In Wisconsin, the four largest sellers controlled 47.74% of the market in 1957, and
58.62% in 1961. In the tri-state area, the eight largest sellers controlled 58.93% of the
market in 1957, and 67.65% in 1961, and the number of competitors selling beer fell from
104 in 1957 to 86 in 1961. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra note 59, at 551.
64 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 558 (1966) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). Mr. justice Harlan points out a number of other factors which bolster the
conclusion that the two contested areas were relevant sections of the country. These include
marketing techniques used by the beer industry, the high cost of promotion before a new
brewer can enter a market, the pattern of regional, statewide, and local distributing
networks, and the differences in state beer regulations. Id. at 559-60.
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"Section of the Country" After Pabst. In one sense Pabst is in line with the
trend since Brown Shoe. That trend has been based upon increasing emphasis
on the ultimate objective of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment-prevention of
economic concentration in its incipiency. 65 This emphasis has been accompanied
by a corresponding de-emphasis of the standard of proof required of the Gov-
ernment. In turn, this de-emphasis seems to have resulted, in Pabst at least, in
the complete erosion of the relevant market concept.
In Philadelphia Nat'l Bank66 the Court held that after having proven the
relevant market, the Government can prevail by showing that (1) the market
share occupied by the merged firm approximates thirty per cent of the relevant
market, and (2) there has been a trend toward concentration in that market,
regardless of its cause. 67 Despite Pabst's consistency with the general trend, a
literal interpretation of the "subsidiary-issue" language of the Court's opinion is
curiously inconsistent with the holding in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank. In the
brewery case, section of the country was subsidiary to the issue of probable
anticompetitive effect. In the bank case, on the other hand, analysis of the rele-
vant market, of which a section of the country is one element, provided the only
rational basis for a measurement of market share, and market share, in turn,
provided presumptive evidence that anticompetitive effects of the merger would
be severe. Thus, the Pabst Court is apparently destroying the most important
analytical concept upon which the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank decision is based.
This raises a very serious question as to the meaning of the term "subsidiary." 68
It is possible that Mr. Justice Black, in speaking for the majority, was restating
the law as it has been. In one sense, "section of the country" has always been a
subsidiary issue. The real issue in any section 7 action is whether the anti-
competitive effects of the merger are, or may be, substantial. While, chronolog-
ically, determination of the geographic market comes first in order to provide a
conceptual geographic framework for testing anticompetitive effect, substantively,
the geographic market is merely a vehicle which focuses attention on the major
issue. In this sense, it is in fact a subsidiary issue.
This interpretation arguably reconciles Pabst and Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
but it neglects two significant facts. First, three of the concurring opinions in.
Pabst (representing four Justices) express the view that the majority has made
a drastic change in the law. Second, as pointed out previously,89 the evidence
was sufficient to warrant reversal on traditional grounds, and it was unnecessary
for the Court to use the "subsidiary-issue" language. These facts suggest that
the majority in Pabst meant the opinion to be read literally. Mr. Justice Harlan
presents this view in persuasively arguing that the majority opinion "appears to
emasculate the statutory phrase 'in any section of the country.' "7 According to
this view, the Court in Pabst rejected the proposition that determination of the
geographic market is a necessary predicate to consideration of the probability
65 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra note 64, at 552; Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
66 United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
67 Id. at 363-64.
68 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra note 64, at 550.
69 See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
TO United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 555 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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that competition will be lessened, and its decision thereby flies in the face of
virtually every case decided under amended section 7.71
Further analysis provides additional support for this view. While it is
undoubtedly true that "Congress ... [was] not . . . troubled about the exact
spot... [where] competition might be lessened,"7 2 it does not necessarily follow
that Congress intended that the spot need not be carefully defined as a part of
the Government's case. As a practical matter, the market-share approach
adopted in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank73 necessitates careful market analysis. There
is no reasonable alternative to careful market analysis short of presumptive
illegality in all section 7 cases. The anticompetitive effects of a merger can
hardly be measured in the abstract.
The conclusion that the Supreme Court is headed in the direction of pre-
sumptive illegality in all section 7 cases by diluting the relevant market concept
is fortified by its treatment of "line of commerce" in recent cases. 74 In each of
three recent antitrust cases in which the line of commerce was at issue, the Court
"has demonstrated a susceptibility for making a finding of a . . . [line of com-
merce] antagonistic to the challenged merger." 75 By fitting the defendant's
71 See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 657 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'I Bank, supra note 66, at 362; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 335 (1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586, 593 (1954); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
259 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp.
153, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
A third possible interpretation of the "subsidiary-issue" language is that the Court wanted
to retain the concept of "section of the country" whenever relevant to a showing of anti-
competitive effect, but to discard it as a separate element of the Government's case. This
is not so much an interpretation supported by the wording of Pabst, however, as it is a
possible position to be taken in later cases.
72 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra note 70, at 549.
73 See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
74 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563
(1966) (alleging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act). It is to be recalled that
line of commerce defines the relevant market in terms of close substitutability of products
while section of the country defines the relevant market in terms of the close substituta-
bility of production facilities. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra at 283
(Stewart, J., dissenting); see notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
75 Note, 41 St. John's L. Rev. 263, 265 (1966). In the Continental Can case, the Court
held that the line of commerce included both aluminum and metal containers, which were
manufactured by the merging corporations, but did not include any other type containers.
United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note 74, at 457. In the Alcoa case, "although
aluminum and copper were virtually interchangeable as conductors and there was compe-
tition between them, the Court held that the two products were in separate lines of
commerce because there was a price difference between the two materials." Note, 41 St. John's
L. Rev. 263, 265 (1966). This allowed the Court to strike down the merger. United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 74, at 277. In Grinnell, the Court saw "no
reason to differentiate between 'line' of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and
'part' of commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act." United States v. Grinnell Corp., supra
note 74, at 573. Compare Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964),
amending Act of April 31, 1914, ch. 323, § 19, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) with Sherman Act § 2,
as amended, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964); see United States v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 667-68 (1964). The Court held that "the entire accredited
central station service business . . . (was] a single market . . . ." This business was
almost exclusively the defendants'-87% of the "market" as defined. United States v,
Grinnell Corp., supra note 74, at 571.
1967] NOTES
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
business "neatly into the product . . market so defined,"7 6 the Court obtained
large market shares for the defendants. These market shares justified a finding
of presumptive illegality under Philadelphia Nat'l Bank.7 7 By thus defining the
product market, the Court found violations of the antitrust laws which are at
least questionable under traditional standards.78
The conclusion appears inescapable that the trend is toward "laying down a
'per se' rule that mergers between two large companies in related industries
are presumptively unlawful under §7." 79 This rule of presumptive illegality
violates congressional intent when based upon questionable market analysis,
since Congress explicitly stated that the Celler-Kefauver Amendment was not
intended to prohibit all mergers, but only those which are economically signifi-
cant. Such significance can only be determined by reference to some specific,
carefully defined market.
CONCLUSION
It is at least arguable that the law under section 7 is clarified by the Pabst
decision. A corporate defendant in a merger case must be well aware that its
chances for victory are slim indeed. Its attorney may feel, as a result of this
case, that he need not spend his client's time and money in gathering elaborate
statistical evidence of the geographic markets, since the Court is likely to find
a section of the country antagonistic to the merger. He might better employ his
efforts concentrating on the issue of probable anticompetitive effect. As a result,
the trial of section 7 actions will be less lengthy,80 and the opposing parties will
marshall their evidence on the crucial issue.
On the other hand, this apparent clarity in the law has a serious shortcoming.
The Court has offered no alternative to careful analysis of market structure
except presumptive illegality. From the standpoint of the corporate defendant,
this is no alternative at all. If the corporation is a large one, the probability of
the merger's being upset will, in effect, be left to the discretion of the Justice
Department or the Federal Trade Commission. 81
Russell J. Guglielmino*
76 Id. at 587 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
77 See United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note 74, at 467 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 74, at 281 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Grinnell Corp., supra note 74, at 585 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
78 Ibid.; see Cook, "Merger Law and Big Business: A Look Ahead," 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
710, 712 (1965); Notes, 41 St. John's L. Rev. 263, 265 (1966), 10 Vill. L. Rev. 734, 804
(1965).
79 United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note 74, at 476 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80 Pabst is illustrative of the calendar problems caused by antitrust litigation. The trial
was scheduled so that two months could be allotted on the court calendar. United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475, 478 (E.D. Wis. 1964), rev'd, 384 U.S. 546 (1966).81 Under Clayton Act § 11, 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964) and Clayton Act
§ 15, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964), the FTC and the Attorney General have
coordinate responsibility to enforce the antitrust laws.
* Editorial Supervisor, Bruce A. Coggeshal.
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